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Decided on April 7, 2022
Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County
Immacolata PapandreaZavaglia, Petitioner,
against
Jose Arroyave, KRYSTAL HERNANDEZARROYAVE, "JOHN
DOE" and/or "JANE DOE", Respondent(s).

Index No. 303636/21

Petitioner: Andrea Balsamo, Esq.
Respondent HernandezArroyave: RiseBoro/LEAP by Dane Marrow, Esq.
Bruce E. Scheckowitz, J.
Recitation, as required by the CPLR § 2219(a), of the papers considered in the review of
this motion to vacating the automatic stay imposed by Respondent's ERAP filing, granting
summary judgment pursuant to CPLR § 3212, and awarding Petitioner reasonable attorneys'
fees.
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Memorandum of law
In this holdover proceeding, the petitioner, Immacolata PapandreaZavaglia
("Petitioner") seeks to recover possession of the unregulated premises located at 1316 72nd
Street, Apt. 1., Brooklyn, New York 11228 ("Premises") from Jose Arroyave, Krystal
HernandezArroyave, John Doe, and Jane Doe (collectively "Respondents") on the grounds
that Petitioner has terminated Respondents' tenancy. See Notice of Petition, Petition, 90 Day
Notice of Termination and Affidavits of Service for the 90 Day Notice of Termination and the
Notice of Petition and Petition. This proceeding first appeared on the court's Intake Part
calendar on January 3, 2022 and was referred to a resolution part. On January 24, 2022, the
proceeding was transferred to the newly created Small Property Part ("SPP") and adjourned
to February 3, 2022. On the return date, Petitioner appeared by counsel, Andrea Balsamo,
Esq., and Respondent HernandezArroyave appeared by counsel, RiseBoro LEAP by Dane
Marrow, Esq. On the [*2]record, counsel for Respondent HernandezArroyave represented
that his client had filed an application for emergency rental assistance through ERAP and
asserted the instant proceeding should be stayed until a final determination was made on her
application by the Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance ("OTDA"). Petitioner
opposed the application for the stay and stated Respondent had been provisionally approved
for ERAP, but Petitioner did not intend to accept any funds from ERAP, so the stay was
unnecessary.This court adjourned the proceeding to March 3, 2022 and directed Respondent
HernandezArroyave to file an answer and for Petitioner to move to vacate the stay. Upon
letter application to the court, and consent by Respondent, the instant proceeding was
adjourned to March 10, 2022.
Petitioner now moves to vacate the automatic stay imposed by Respondent Hernandez
Arroyave's application for rental assistance through ERAP, for summary judgment pursuant
to CPLR § 3212, and for attorney's fees. Related to her prayer for relief to lift the automatic
stay, Petitioner asserts that she has elected not to participate in the ERAP program and is
willing to waive the one hundred and eighty (180) day period allowed under the program for
the submission of necessary documents. She further argues that the stay imposed by ERAP is
a violation of Petitioner's due process rights similar to that of the COVID19 Emergency

Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (hereinafter "CEEFPA"), as adjudged by
the United States Supreme Court. Landlord represents Respondent HernandezArroyave was
notified that Petitioner intended to waive any rights to collect ERAP funds so that holdover
may proceed. Further, Petitioner asserts she is entitled to summary judgment, as the premises
is a twofamily house, not subject the NYC Rent Control laws or governed by the Rent
Stabilizations Laws of 1969, 1974, and 2019, and since the tenancy has been terminated,
Respondents do not have any statutory right to remain in the Premises. Respondent opposes
and avers it is outside the Housing Court's jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's argument, as
landlord seeks to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7 of Subpart A of Part BB of
chapter 56 of the laws of 2021, as amended by Section 4 of Part A of the Chapter 417 of the
laws of 2021 ("ERAP statute"), which stays evictions upon the filing of an ERAP application
until OTDA makes a final determination about Respondent's eligibility. Respondent posits
Petitioner, in effect, is seeking a declaratory judgment as to the rights of the parties, and the
Housing Court does not have the jurisdiction to render a decision, which Petitioner can only
seek in Supreme Court. Respondent also represents such a constitutional challenge requires
Petitioner to serve the New York State Attorney General's Office. Finally, during oral
argument Respondent asserted the instant proceeding should be dismissed as Petitioner failed
to exercise the requisite due diligence as required by section 4 of Subpart A of Part C of
Chapter 417 of the laws of 2021 when serving the Ninety (90) Day Notice of Termination.
Preliminarily, though Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of the automatic stay
imposed as a result of an ERAP application on due process grounds, Respondent correctly
avers that Petitioner's failure to serve the New York State Attorney General's Office
precludes this court from considering this argument. However, the court is not required to
consider the constitutionality of the ERAP statute in order to determine whether that
provision of the statute is applicable to the facts herein. 2986 Briggs LLC v. Evans, et al.,
2022 NY Slip Op. 50215(U), *35 (Civ. Ct. Bronx Co., J. Lutwak).
Relating to applications for a stay, in general, CPLR 2201 provides that "[e]xcept where
otherwise prescribed by law, the court in which an action [or proceeding] is pending may
grant a stay of proceedings in a proper case, upon such terms as may be just." This section
authorizes [*3]courts of original civil jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings. See
Schwartz v. New York City Housing Authority, 219 AD2d 47, 47 (A.D. 2nd Dept. 1996). A
determination as to whether to grant a stay of a proceeding is a discretionary one as "courts
have the inherent power, and indeed responsibility, so essential to the proper administration
of justice, to control their calendars and to supervise the course of litigation before them."
See Grisi v. Shainswit, 119 AD2d 418 (A.D. 1st Dept.1986); See also Catalane v. Plaza 400

Owners Corp.,124 AD2d 478, 480 (A.D. 1st Dept.1986).
Since March 2020, the New York state legislature and the governor's office have
promulgated legislation and executive orders to protect tenants who have been impacted by
the pandemic from being evicted. The initial measures, including the COVID19 Emergency
Eviction and Foreclosure Prevention Act of 2020 (hereinafter "CEEFPA") and Section 4 of
Subpart A of Part C of Chapter 417 of the laws of 2021, were prophylactic rules which
blanketly stayed those proceedings which were not objectionable conduct/nuisance
holdovers, HP proceedings, and illegal lockout proceedings, for tenants and occupants who
faced financial hardship due to Covid19, or whose health has been or could be negatively
affected by an eviction or moving during the pandemic. Unlike previous statutes, the ERAP
statute provides a benefit to tenants and landlords in the form of payment of accrued rental
arrears and prospective rent and stays an eviction proceeding upon an ERAP application
pending an eligibility determination by OTDA.
After the instant motion was made, numerous courts of concurrent jurisdiction have
ruled on whether the automatic stay imposed by the filing of an ERAP application can be
lifted by the court, and, if so, under what circumstances. The considerations for vacating the
stay include, the regulatory status of the premises, the nature of the cause of action, the
relationship between the applicant and the landlord, does the applicant meet the basic
criterion for assistance as outlined in the statute, and whether the equities favor the landlord.
See e.g. Actie v. Gregory, 2022 NY Slip Op 50117(U)(Civ. Ct. Kings Co, J. Slade) (court
vacated an ERAP stay in a holdover proceeding where Petitioner sought to recover
possession of an apartment in a building with less than four units for his own personal use
and applicant had already vacated the premises), Kelly v. Doe, 2022 NY Slip Op. 22077 (Civ
Ct. Kings Co, J., Cohen) (court vacated a stay in a postforeclosure holdover proceeding
finding that Respondent had no contractual obligation to pay rent to landlord), Abuelafiya v.
Orena, 73 Misc 3d 576 (Dist. Ct. 3rd Dist, Suffolk Co., 2021) (court vacated stay when it
was determined that applicant had second home), 2986 Briggs LLC v. Evans, et al., 2022 NY
Slip Op. 50215(U)(Civ. Ct. Bronx Co., J. Lutwak)(court vacated ERAP stay in a licensee
holdover proceeding where there was no contractual obligation for Respondent to pay rent or
use and occupancy), Ben Ami v. Ronen, et al., Civ. Ct. Kings Co., March 23, 2022, Barany, J.,
index no. 59050/20 (court vacated ERAP stay in a holdover proceeding where Petitioner
sought to recover the premises, an unregulated apartment, for his personal use), Silverstein v
Huebner, et al., Civ. Ct. Kings Co., March 29, 2022, Stoller, J., index no. 94101/18 (court
vacated an ERAP stay in a holdover proceeding where remaining occupant was licensee in an
unregulated apartment and Petitioner sought to recover the apartment for his personal use);

see cf. 204 W. 55th Street, LLC v Mackler, 2021 NY Slip Op. 32901(U) (Civ. Ct. NY Co., J.
Fang) (ERAP stay upheld in a licensee holdover proceeding, where respondents allege
succession to the subject rent regulated premises), 560566 Hudson LLC v Hillman, et al.,
NYLJ 1646709605NY30044621 (Civ. Ct. NY Co., 2022, J. Ferdinand) (upholding the ERAP
stay in a licensee proceeding in a rent regulated building).
In the instant proceeding, this court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated that payment
of rental arrears will not resolve the instant matter, and that the equities strongly favor
Petitioner. In consideration of the arguments made in support and opposition of the motion,
the court finds that Petitioner has demonstrated grounds to advance this proceeding by
vacating the stay. The automatic stay under ERAP triggers when respondent seeks "funds to
cover all or part of the arrears claimed by the petitioner." The ERAP statute, unlike CEEFPA,
is not a measure designed to protect litigants where rent is not the basis for seeking
possession. A stay under the ERAP statute is appropriate only when the benefit provided
could potentially resolve litigation. Acceptance of payment of "benefits" from ERAP prior to
issue being joined would have the effect of vitiating the predicate notice and constitute
grounds for dismissal because the statute requires landlord, upon receipt of payment, to ratify
the lease term or period of possession for an additional twelve (12) months before owner
could commence a new holdover proceeding. L. 2021, c. 56, Part BB, Subpart A §9(2)(d)
(iv); see also Pacheco, Pacheco v. Gilkes, et al., Civ. Ct. Kings Co., March 10, 2022,
Scheckowitz, J., index no. 300063/20; see c.f. 1264 Flatbush LLC v. Robinson, Civ. Ct. Kings
Co., March 25, 2022, Cohen, J., index no. 73530/19 (court stayed execution of the warrant of
eviction for a period of one year after Petitioner accepted ERAP funds).
The court must avoid an unreasonable or absurd application of a law when interpreting a
statute. People v. Schneider, 37 NY3d 187, 196 (2021). The ERAP legislation was not
intended to act as prophylactic statute and nor was it designed to create a barrier preventing
small property owners from advancing litigation involving residential properties, where the
tenancy is not subject to statutory control, landlord expresses its intent not to seek use and
occupancy, and desires to pursue litigation where the tenancy has been property terminated.
Here, the proceeding was commenced prior to the enactment of the ERAP statute and the
petition initially sought use and occupancy, which the landlord was permitted to do.
However, Petitioner represents that upon the passage of the ERAP statute, landlord informed
Respondent that she would no longer be seeking use and occupancy and is only interested in
regaining possession of this unregulated apartment so that the building may be sold.
Requiring landlord to wait 180 days to receive an approval from ERAP is an unnecessary
exercise in futility where landlord has no intention of accepting such payment and reinstating

the terminated tenancy.
Accordingly, the branch of Petitioner's motion seeking to vacate the ERAP stay is
granted. The branch of petitioner's motion seeking summary judgment is denied without
prejudice. Here, though issue is now joined, an answer was not served prior to Petitioner
moving for this relief. Therefore, the request for summary judgment is premature. Also,
though Respondent challenged the sufficiency of service of the predicate notice during oral
argument on this motion, CPLR § 2214(a) limits the jurisdiction of the court to grant relief
that is not contained within moving papers. McGuire v. McGuire. 29 AD3d 963 (2d Dept
2006). As Respondent did not raise this issue in its cross-motion to dismiss, this court will
not entertain Respondent's application for dismissal.
The instant proceeding is adjourned to April 28, 2022 at 12:00 P.M. for control
purposes.
This constitutes the decision and order of the court.

Dated: April 7, 2022
Brooklyn, New York
HON. BRUCE E. SCHECKOWITZ
J.H.C.
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